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COURT OF APPEALS OF NEW YORK
People v. McBride'
(decided April 29, 2010)
Norman McBride was arrested for his involvement in a
gunpoint robbery.2 A grand jury indicted McBride for robbery in the
first degree, robbery in the second degree, and "other related charges
stemming from [the] incident."3  Before McBride pleaded guilty to
attempted robbery in the second degree, he filed a motion to suppress
evidence obtained at his home during his arrest.4 The Supreme
Court, New York County, conducted a pretrial hearing to determine
whether McBride's constitutional right against unlawful searches and
seizures under the United States Constitution' and the New York
State Constitution' were violated when police entered his home
without a warrant.7 The trial court denied McBride's suppression
motion and McBride was sentenced on his guilty plea.' McBride
appealed the decision to the Appellate Division, First Department,
928 N.E.2d 1027 (N.Y. 2010).
2 Id. at 1029.
Id.
4 id.
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution states, in pertinent part: "The
right of the people to be secure in their persons . . . against unreasonable searches and
seizures, shall not be violated. . . ."
6 Article I, section 12 of the New York Constitution states, in pertinent part: "The right of
the people to be secure in their persons . . . against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall
not be violated. . . ."
7 McBride, 928 N.E.2d at 1029. The court also addressed "whether the police unlawfully
... seized physical evidence in [the defendant's] home, whether the defendant's lineup was
unduly suggestive, and whether the statements taken from defendant by the police violated
defendant's Miranda rights." Id. The court determined that the seizure of evidence was
proper because the warrantless entry was lawful and the evidence was in plain view, the
defendant's lineup was not unduly suggestive, and there was no violation of the defendant's
Miranda rights because he knowingly waived those rights. Id. at 1031-32.
8 Id. at 1029.
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which upheld both the conviction and the sentence.' On further
appeal, the New York Court of Appeals determined that exigent
circumstances rendered the warrantless search lawful, and affirmed
the decision.'o
"[O]n March 22, 2004, Detective Shaska of the New York
City Police Department went to ... investigate a gunpoint robbery"
at a restaurant in Manhattan that occurred the day before." While at
the restaurant, Shaska interviewed Mangual, an employee who saw
McBride and two other men walk into the restaurant before the
robbery occurred.12 "Moments later, Mangual saw" McBride reveal
a gun and "direct the restaurant manager to the" safe, from which
McBride took money and thereafter fled with the other two men.13
Along with the detailed summary of events gathered from
Mangual, Shaska obtained a list of former employees of the
restaurant, which contained the defendant's name.14 Shaska learned
that McBride had a criminal record and that he was on parole.'" She
contacted the parole officer to obtain McBride's address and later that
night went to McBride's apartment with four police officers,
including Detective Santeufemia.' 6 While approaching the front
door, the officers heard voices from inside the apartment and
proceeded to knock on the door while identifying themselves, but
there was no response.' 7 McBride had instructed Leona Mitchell, a
young woman in McBride's apartment, to ignore the police officers'
requests.1 8 After a few minutes, one officer used the intercom system
to call the apartment, in which a person "believed to be male
answered."' 9 At the same time, Shaska and another officer accessed
a fire escape that enabled them to peer through a window of the
apartment.20 Spotting a man lying on the floor, "Shaska or her
9 Id.





's McBride, 928 N.E.2d at 1029.
16 Id. at 1030.
18 Id.
19 Id
20 McBride, 928 N.E.2d at 1030.
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partner knocked on the window," with guns drawn, and stated that
they were from the police department.21 Shortly after, Shaska
observed Mitchell run towards the front door, where Santeufemia
remained.22 Mitchell answered the front door crying and
hyperventilating.23 Santeufemia attempted to calm Mitchell, who did
not respond to his questions.24 Because of her condition,
Santeufemia "believe[d] that she was facing a life-threatening
situation" and "decided to enter [McBride's] apartment to
investigate." 25  While in the apartment, he saw McBride and
handcuffed him.26
The lower court rejected the defendant's argument that the
conduct of the police at the apartment created exigent circumstances
by frightening Mitchell and causing her to become distressed. 27 The
New York Court of Appeals acknowledged that although the
warrantless entry was lawful, "it would have been more prudent if the
police obtained a warrant for defendant's arrest before going to his
home."28 Although three days elapsed between the identification of
McBride as the gunman and his subsequent arrest, exigent
circumstances justified the warrantless entry.2 9
In determining whether the warrantless entry was justified by
exigent circumstances, the New York Court of Appeals used an
objective approach adopted by the federal courts, which is comprised
of a six-factor test:
(1) the gravity or violent nature of the offense with
which the suspect is to be charged; (2) whether the
suspect is reasonably believed to be armed; (3) a clear
showing of probable cause . . . to believe that the
suspect committed the crime; (4) strong reason to
believe that the suspect is in the premises being





2 McBride, 928 N.E.2d at 1030.
26 id
27 Id at 1031.
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not swiftly apprehended; and (6) the peaceful
circumstances of the entry.30
Although the factors were instrumental in the court's analysis,
the court noted "that th[e] list is illustrative" and that "the ultimate
inquiry . . . [wa]s 'whether in light of all the facts of the particular
case there was an urgent need that justifies a warrantless entry[.]' "31
The court determined that exigent circumstances were present based
on the combination of "the police ha[ving] probable cause to arrest
[McBride] for armed robbery, a violent crime[,] . . . [their] strong
belief that [McBride] was inside his apartment and that they only
entered the [] apartment after Mitchell opened the door and they
observed her crying, hyperventilating, and [being] unresponsive to
their questions."32
To fully comprehend the New York Court of Appeal's
reasoning, it is essential to examine federal court decisions to explain
the warrant requirement. In Payton v. New York,33 the defendant
moved to suppress evidence taken from his apartment by New York
detectives without a warrant. The detectives, having probable
cause, went to the defendant's apartment with the intention of
arresting him for an alleged murder of a gas station manager. 3s After
knocking on the door with no response, even though "light and music
emanated from the apartment," they requested emergency assistance
to open the door.36 About thirty minutes later, the officers entered
the apartment.37 No one was found in the apartment, but police
obtained a .30-caliber shell casing, which "was seized and later
admitted into evidence at [the] murder trial."3 The trial court held
that the warrantless entry by the officers to make a routine felony
arrest "was authorized by the New York Code of Criminal
Procedure." 39 The Appellate Division, First Department and the New
30 McBride, 928 N.E.2d at 1031 (quoting United States v. Martinez-Gonzalez, 686 F.2d
93, 100 (2d Cir. 1982) (internal quotation marks omitted).
31 Id. at 1031 (quoting Martinez-Gonzalez, 686 F.2d at 100).
32 id.
n 445 U.S. 573 (1980).
3 Id. at 577.
s Id. at 576.
36 Id.
SId.
38 Payton, 445 U.S. at 576-77.
3 Id. at 577. As of January 15, 1970, the Code of Criminal Procedure, section 177 read:
572 [Vol. 27
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York Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment.40
The United States Supreme Court reversed, holding that it is
unconstitutional for police to "mak[e] a warrantless and
nonconsensual entry into a suspect's home in order to make a routine
felony arrest." 41 The Court determined that warrantless searches
inside a home are "condemned by the plain language of the first
clause of the [Fourth] Amendment," and are presumed to be
unreasonable. 42  The Court, however, noted that "the warrantless
entry to effect Payton's arrest might have been justified by exigent
circumstances." 43  However, there was no emergency or dangerous
situation that arose in the case for the Court to consider the
exception."
In Kirk v. Louisiana,5 the Supreme Court overturned a
Louisiana Court of Appeal's decision that a warrantless entry, absent
exigent circumstances, did not violate the Fourth Amendment.4 6 The
defendant was charged "with possession of cocaine with intent to
distribute" after being arrested at his apartment by police officers
who had been observing the apartment due to a "citizen complaint
that drug sales were occurring there."47 While observing the
apartment, the officers saw the defendant transact with a buyer and
stopped the buyer once he left the apartment.48 Concerned about the
possibility of destruction of evidence, the officers decided to enter the
apartment without a warrant and found cocaine and money from the
transactions. 4 9 The defendant "filed a pretrial motion to suppress the
evidence obtained" from the warrantless entry, but the trial court
denied suppression of the evidence, and the defendant was convicted
of the drug charges.5  "On direct review to the Louisiana Court of
"[Al peace officer may, without a warrant, arrest a person . .. when a felony has in fact been
committed, and he has reasonable cause for believing the person to be arrest to have
committed it." Id. at 578.
4 Id. at 578-79.
41 Id. at 576.
42 Payton, 445 U.S. at 585-86.
43 Id. at 583.
44 Id.
45 536 U.S. 635 (2002).




so Kirk, 536 U.S. at 636.
2011] 573
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Appeals," the defendant argued that there were no exigent
circumstances to justify the warrantless entry in the apartment.5 ' By
a slim margin, the Louisiana Supreme Court denied review.52 The
court acknowledged the defendant's argument, but decided not to
determine whether exigent circumstances were present because
"'[t]he officers had probable cause to arrest and properly searched
the defendant incident thereto.' "53
The Supreme Court did not agree with the Louisiana Court of
Appeal's decision. The Court relied upon its holding in Payton,
stating that "police officers need[ed] either a warrant or probable
cause plus exigent circumstances in order to make a lawful entry into
a home." 54 The lower court's failure to examine whether exigent
circumstances were present violated Payton and made the officer's
actions unconstitutional. 5
United States v. Martinez-Gonzalezs6 expanded the Payton
holding by applying the exigent circumstances exception. The
Second Circuit reversed a judgment by the United States District
Court for the Eastern District of New York that suppressed evidence
seized in the defendant's apartment obtained by a warrantless entry
and arrest." The defendant was arrested after police entered his
apartment without a warrant and stopped him from disposing large
quantities of white powder into a toilet.5 8  The defendant was
"indicted for conspiring to possess with intent to distribute
cocaine." 59 The defendant moved to suppress the evidence that was
seized from the apartment, and the district court granted the motion.60
The court determined that because " '(t)here were no sounds
indicating destruction of evidence . . . and there was no testimony
from the [officers] that they feared such destruction,' " there were no
exigent circumstances present, prohibiting a warrantless entry and
" Id. at 636-37.
52 Id. at 637 (noting that review was denied by a vote of four-to-three).
s3 Id. (quoting Louisiana v. Dirk, 773 So. 2d 259, 263 (4th Cir. 2000)).
" Id. at 638.
" Kirk, 536 U.S. at 638.
56 686 F.2d 93 (2d Cir. 1982).










The Second Circuit reversed, holding that while the district
court correctly applied the ruling in Payton and assessed whether
exigent circumstances were present, it misinterpreted a decision made
in United States v. Gomez.62 The Second Circuit created a six-factor
test to be used to assess whether exigent circumstances are present.63
The list of factors is not exclusive because the absence of particular
factors does not rule out the possibility of exigent circumstances
being present, and other factors may be included when relevant.
The court held that exigent circumstances were present at the time of
the warrantless entry because several factors of the six-factor test
were met, such as the police having probable cause of the defendant's
involvement in trafficking cocaine, a serious offense, knowing that
any delay in arresting the defendant would likely result in the
destruction of evidence, having reason to believe the defendant was
armed because a revolver was found in an apartment of a woman
whom the defendant had close connections with, and used a peaceful
means to enter the apartment, by using the woman's key.65
Therefore, the warrantless entry was justified and the evidence
obtained from it was wrongfully suppressed.66
In Payton, the United States Supreme Court refused to
consider what types of situations would be described as exigent
circumstances. However, in Welsh v. Wisconsin,68 the Supreme
Court took a step towards answering this question by holding that the
Fourth Amendment prohibits a warrantless entry of the home to arrest
for a minor civil traffic offense.69 In Welsh, police officers
responded to a call from a witness, who described the defendant's
erratic driving and explained that he swerved off the road, seemed to
61 Martinez-Gonzalez, 686 F.2d at 97.
62 633 F.2d 999, 1008 (2d Cir. 1980) (indicating that exigent circumstances consist of "the
classic sounds indicating destruction of evidence"). The Second Circuit in Martinez-
Gonzalez stated that "the district court took too narrow a view" of this concept and what
constitutes exigent circumstances "is not limited to circumstances indicating the destruction
of evidence." Martinez-Gonzalez, 868 F.2d at 100.
63 Id.
SId.
61 Id. at 100-01.
6 Id. at 102.
67 Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 740, 742 (1984).
68 Id. at 740.
6 Id. at 754.
2011] 575
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be either intoxicated or sick.70 The defendant walked away from the
scene before the police arrived, but the officer learned of the
defendant's address from the abandoned vehicle's registration
number and proceeded to his home.7 ' After the defendant's step-
daughter answered the door, the police entered the house without a
warrant and placed the defendant under arrest for operating a motor
vehicle while under the influence and refusing to take a breath-
analysis test.72 The Supreme Court of Wisconsin established that
several factors for exigent circumstances were present, such as the "
'hot pursuit' of a suspect, the need to prevent physical harm to the
offender and the public, and the need to prevent destruction of the
evidence," reversed the appellate court's decision that the warrantless
entry was unconstitutional, and upheld the trial court's judgment to
suspend the defendant's driver's license.73
It was difficult for the Supreme Court justices to envision a
warrantless entry that would be reasonable under the Fourth
Amendment for a minor offense.74 On this basis, the Supreme Court
has been hesitant to find exigent circumstances concerning minor
offenses, even if probable cause existed. Although the police had
probable cause to arrest the defendant, the hot pursuit claim had no
merit "because there was no immediate or continuous pursuit of the"
defendant, the defendant abandoned his car, and "there was little
remaining threat to public safety." 76  To allow a warrantless entry
into a home in an effort to preserve evidence for such a minor offense
"would be to approve unreasonable police behavior that the
principles of the Fourth Amendment will not sanction."7 7 Therefore,
the Supreme Court held that the gravity of the offense for which the
arrest is to be made should be an important factor when considering if
exigent circumstances exist.78
The existence of only one factor of the six-factor test,
70 Id at 742.
72 Welsh, 466 U.S. at 743. The State of Wisconsin classifies driving while intoxicated as a
noncriminal, civil offense for which there is no imprisonment. Id at 754.
1 Id. at 747-48.
74 Id. at 753.
7 Id. at 750.
76 Welsh, 466 U.S. at 753.
n Id. at 754.
7 Id. at 753.
[Vol. 27576
8
Touro Law Review, Vol. 27 [2011], No. 3, Art. 5
https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol27/iss3/5
SEARCH AND SEIZURE
although important, may not constitute exigent circumstances to
justify a warrantless entry. For example, in Mincey v. Arizona, 7 the
Supreme Court reversed the lower court's decision that the
warrantless entry and search of the defendant's apartment had not
violated the Fourth Amendment." In Mincey, an undercover police
officer arranged to purchase heroin from the defendant at his
apartment.81  In an effort to break up the drug sale, the officer,
accompanied by nine other officers, gained entry into the apartment
when one of the defendant's acquaintances opened the door. 82 The
confrontation led to gun shots between the undercover officer and the
defendant, resulting in the officer being wounded from the
crossfire. The Mincey Court held that police officers are not
prohibited from warrantless entry by the Fourth Amendment when a
person within a residence is in need of immediate assistance.8 4 The
Court noted that " '[t]he need to protect or preserve life or avoid
serious injury [] justifies] [] what would be otherwise [an] illegal
[entry].' "585
However, the Court determined that a "warrantless search
must be 'strictly circumscribed by the exigencies which justify its
initiation.' "86 Even though the initial warrantless entry to aid the
wounded officer was justifiable due to an emergency, the ensuing
entry of homicide officers and the four day search that occurred
afterwards was not justified.8 ' Although a homicide is a serious
offense, the four day search, which "included opening dresser
drawers and ripping up carpets[,] can hardly be rationalized in terms
of the legitimate concerns that justify an emergency search."8
The Supreme Court has held that the determination of the
existence of exigent circumstances by the six-factor test is measured
by an objective analysis. In Brigham City v. Stuart,89 the Court
' 437 U.S. 385 (1978).
80 Id. at 390.
" Id. at 387.
82 id.
83 id.
8 Mincey, 437 U.S. at 392.
85 Id. (quoting Wayne v. United States, 318 F.2d 205, 213 (D.C. Cir. 1963)).
86 Id. at 393 (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 25-26 (1968).
87 Id.
88 Id.
8 547 U.S. 398 (2006).
2011] 577
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determined that the subjective motives of police officers were
irrelevant when they entered a home without a warrant in order to
break up an altercation between several adult men and a juvenile.90
An officer's state of mind is irrelevant, " 'as long as the
circumstances, viewed objectively, justify [the] action.' "9' The
Court held that the officer's entry was reasonable to assist an injured
adult and to halt the violence that was beginning to brew. 92  The
Court determined that any police officer in that situation would have
done the same because "[t]he role of a peace officer includes
preventing violence and restoring order, not simply rendering first aid
to casualties." 93
The New York Court of Appeals decision in McBride was a
result of the application of the objective approach that has been
applied in prior New York State cases. In People v. Levan,94 the
Court of Appeals reversed an order by the Appellate Division stating
that the warrantless entry of defendant's apartment by the police was
lawful.95 The police went to the defendant's apartment pursuant to
an eyewitness report that the defendant shot someone. 96 When police
approached the second floor of the apartment building, they observed
the defendant's neighbor ring the defendant's doorbell and knock on
his door.97 As soon as the defendant answered the door, the officers
entered the apartment with their guns drawn, arrested the defendant,
and seized a gun that was found in his closet.9 8 Although section 178
of the New York Code of Criminal Procedure99 was deemed
unconstitutional by the United States Supreme Court in Payton,00 the
trial court still denied the defendant's motion to suppress the gun
90 Id. at 405.
9 Id. at 404 (quoting Scott v. United States, 436 U.S. 128, 138 (1978)).
92 Id. at 406.
94 464 N.E.2d 469 (1984).
95 Id
96 Id at 470.
97 id
98 id
9 See Payton, 445 U.S. at 577. The Code provided that the police could, without exigent
circumstances, enter a person's home to arrest the person without a warrant. Levan, 464
N.E.2d at 470.
1" See People v. Payton, 380 N.E.2d 224 (N.Y. 1978) (holding that a warrantless entry of
an officer, for the purpose of a felony arrest, into one's home, if based on probable cause,
does not violate the Fourth Amendment, even absent exigent circumstances).
578 [Vol. 27
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seized in his apartment.'0 ' The Appellate Division affirmed the
decision, with the majority concluding that Payton did not apply
because once the defendant opened the door, he was " 'clearly visible
to the police and to anyone else who might be in the public hallway'
and therefore 'not in an area where [he] had any expectation of
privacy.' "o102
The Court of Appeals held that because no exigent
circumstances were present, under Payton, the warrantless entry by
the police was unconstitutional. 0 3  In its decision, the court
disregarded the expectation of privacy argument because " 'physical
entry of the home is the chief evil against which the wording of the
Fourth Amendment is directed.' "104 It was clear that the police
forcibly entered the defendant's apartment without a warrant, and
although the defendant was in view when he answered the door, it did
not make the entry constitutional. 05  The court mentioned that
"[b]oth the Fourth Amendment and section 12 of article I of the New
York Constitution expressly provide that 'the right of the people to be
secure in their . .. houses . . . shall not be violated.' ,106
In People v. Cruz, 07 the Appellate Division adopted the six-
factor test, applied in Martinez-Gonzalez, to determine whether
exigent circumstances existed. While investigating an armed
robbery, the police were informed by the victim's husband of the
defendant's whereabouts.'s The police used force to enter the
defendant's apartment and arrested him along with a codefendant.'09
Although the first factor of the test was met because the officers were
investigating an armed robbery, a serious offense, the court held that
the serious offense " 'alone does not overcome the presumption of
unreasonableness that attaches to a warrantless house arrest.' "10
101 Levan, 464 N.E.2d at 470.
102 Id. at 470-71 (holding that whenever something is exposed to the public, it does not get
the Fourth Amendment protection).
103 Id. at 471.
'04 Id. (quoting United States v. United States Dist. Ct., 407 U.S. 297, 313 (1972)).
1os Id.
106 Levan, 464 N.E.2d at 471.
107 545 N.Y.S.2d 561 (App. Div. 1st Dep't 1989).
10 Id. at 563.
1o9 Id.
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The remaining factors did not convince the court that exigent
circumstances were present; therefore, the court reversed the trial
court's decision and held that the warrantless entry into the
defendant's apartment was unlawful."' The court reasoned that the
police did not have probable cause to believe that they would find the
two robbery suspects in the apartment based on a weak tip given by
the victim's husband.11 2 Furthermore, police did not have had any
evidence that the suspects were planning to flee, they did not
peacefully enter the apartment, and they only waited about a minute
before knocking down the door." 3
Unlike the federal courts, the New York Court of Appeals has
not consistently utilized the objective approach when determining the
existence of exigent circumstances. Instead, it occasionally has
applied a subjective approach. In People v. Mitchell,"4 the Court of
Appeals established guidelines for the subjective approach, known as
the emergency exception, when assessing whether exigent
circumstances are present. 1 5  In Mitchell, the police entered the
defendant's hotel room, in search of a chambermaid who had been
missing.116 In the room, the police found the chambermaid's corpse
along with a hatchet.' The trial court denied the defendant's motion
to suppress the evidence obtained from the warrantless search. 18
The defendant was convicted of murder, and the conviction was
affirmed by the Appellate Division." 9
The Court of Appeals, in determining that exigent
circumstances were present to justify the warrantless entry, outlined
and applied elements of the emergency exception, which are:
1) The police must have reasonable grounds to believe
that there is an emergency at hand and an immediate
need for their assistance for the protection of life or
property[;] 2) The search must not be primarily
motivated by intent to arrest and seize evidence[; and]
.' Id. at 568.
112 Cruz, 545 N.Y.S.2d at 565-66.
113 Id. at 567.
114 347 N.E.2d 607 (N.Y. 1976).
"s Id. at 609.
116 Id. at 608.
"' Id. at 609.
118 idt
"9 Mitchell, 347 N.E.2d at 609.
580 [Vol. 27
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3) There must be some reasonable basis,
approximating probable cause, to associate the
emergency with the area or place to be searched.120
First, the police had reasonable grounds to believe there was
an emergency that needed immediate assistance because the
chambermaid had not been seen for hours and "the circumstances led
to the conclusion that some grave misfortune of an indeterminable
nature had befallen the maid."'21 In addition, the purpose of the
officer's entry into the apartment was to render aid to a missing
chambermaid rather than gathering evidence of a crime.122 Lastly,
the officers performed a thorough search of the entire hotel, and the
last room inspected was the defendant's, which was on the floor
where the chambermaid was last seen.123 With all of the elements
satisfied, the court determined that because an emergency created
exigent circumstances, the warrantless entry into the hotel room was
lawful. 124
The Court of Appeals in People v. Molnarl25 expanded the
emergency exception elements established in Mitchell. In affirming
the lower court's decision to convict the defendant of murder in the
second degree and the denial of a suppression motion for evidence
found from a warrantless entry into his home by police,126 the court
focused its decision on whether the police had reasonable grounds to
believe that there was an emergency.127 The police responded to a
neighbor's complaint of a strange odor emanating from the
defendant's apartment.128  After an hour of assessing alternative
options for entering the apartment because the defendant was not in
his apartment, the police ultimately decided that it was necessary to
use force.129 The police entered the apartment, and found a body that
was severely decomposed, covered with maggots, and surrounded by
120 Id. at 609.
121 Id. at 610.
122 id.
123 id.
124 Mitchell, 347 N.E.2d at 611.
125 774 N.E.2d 738 (N.Y. 2002).
126 Id. at 739.
127 Id. at 741.
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vermin and flies. 30 Despite arguments of odor not constituting an
emergency and the length of time the police allowed to go by before
they decided to enter the apartment, the court determined that "not all
emergencies are the same."l 3' Reasonableness governs how police
respond to emergencies, between one extreme of using force
immediately to break into a premises when a hostage is held, to not
authorizing police to enter the premises to remedy a minor irritant.13 2
The court noted that "[t]he Fourth Amendment's warrant requirement
was not meant to apply to situations where police reasonably need to
enter a premises for a legitimate, benevolent purpose distinct from
crime-fighting." 33 This purpose is to act as public servants to protect
"public health and safety" and police are not required to obtain a
warrant when reasonably acting in a community caretaking
function.134
When the court in McBride did not use the emergency
exception and instead applied the six-factor test, the court, in essence,
disregarded the subjective approach in favor of the objective
approach. Although there have been some cases where the New
York Court of Appeals utilized the subjective approach instead of the
objective approach, in this instant case, the court did not make any
mention to it.' 35 The court held in McBride that for a warrantless
entry to be lawful under the Fourth Amendment and the New York
State Constitution, probable cause must be accompanied by exigent
circumstances.' 36 The majority opinion was joined by three other
justices, one justice dissented, and another took no part in the
opinion. m In the majority opinion, the court did not examine
whether the officer's intent was to arrest and seize evidence when
arriving at defendant's apartment, as one would when applying the
second element of the emergency exception.138 Instead, the court
130 Molnar, 774 N.E.2d at 739.
131 Id. at 741.
132 id
133 id
134 Id. at 742. The community caretaking function is another exception to the warrant
requirement. See Community Caretaking Guide, 2 No. 4 CRIM. PRAc. GUIDE 3 (2001).
..s McBride, 928 N.E.2d at 1032 n.*.
136 Id at 1030-31.
13 Id. at 1035 (noting that Judges Graffeo, Read and Smith concurred with Judge
Ciparick, Judge Pigott dissented in a separate opinion in which Judge Jones concurred, and
Chief Judge Lippman took no part in the opinion).
' Mitchell, 347 N.E.2d at 609.
582 [Vol. 27
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viewed the circumstances objectively when applying the six-factor
test to determine whether the police's actions were justified by
exigent circumstances.13 9 The first factor was satisfied because an
armed robbery is a violent offense.140  The third factor was also
satisfied since the defendant did not dispute whether "the police had
probable cause to arrest him for armed robbery."1 4 ' Although the
court does not explicitly state whether the second factor was satisfied,
it is safe to assume that it was because the defendant was suspected
of committing armed robbery and therefore likely that he was in
possession of dangerous weapons when confronted by police. The
findings in the record show that the fourth factor was satisfied
because the police had a strong reason to believe that the defendant
was inside his apartment, along with the sixth factor because the
police only entered the apartment to assist Mitchell, who was crying
and hyperventilating.142
The dissenting opinion does not dispute the application of
Payton, but holds that the existence of an exigent circumstance does
not excuse the failure to obtain a warrant when there was ample time
to secure a warrant, and thus making the warrantless entry "a clear
Payton violation." 43 The dissenting opinion stated that the real issue
was whether the police, with their intentions to arrest the defendant,
could have obtained a warrant prior to entering his apartment.'" The
dissent focused its discussion on the amount of time that passed
between the identification of the defendant and the police arriving at
the defendant's apartment, which was three days.145 The factors were
"blindly" applied, missing the point that there was no evidence to
suggest that the police "had to act quickly to arrest the defendant."146
The majority recognized that it would have been prudent of the police
to first obtain a warrant before going to the defendant's apartment,
but also noted "that there [i]s nothing illegal about the police going to
a defendant's apartment and requesting that he voluntarily come




143 Id. at 1034 (Pigott, J., dissenting).
'" McBride, 928 N.E.2d at 1033-34.




Leocata: Court of Appeals of New York: People v. McBride
Published by Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center, 2011
TOURO LAWREVIEW
out." 47
With the dissenting opinion in mind, there seems to be a flaw
in the six-factor test. With every case having a different set of facts,
it is extremely difficult to establish a bright line rule for the amount
of time police have to obtain a warrant. To clear up any
misconceptions about whether the police had enough time to obtain a
warrant, another factor should be added to the list. A temporal
requirement, describing a reasonable time frame to obtain a warrant,
would give notice to police and other authorities about the amount of
time it has to gather the necessary facts to obtain a warrant and to
plan accordingly. A period of time, although not effective in every
case, is more definitive than having no timeframe at all.
In conclusion, the court in McBride correctly chose to
objectively view the circumstances and apply the six-factor test to
uphold the lower court's holding that the warrantless entry of
McBride's apartment was constitutional. If there was a temporal
requirement factor included in the six-factor test, it may have
impacted the court's decision. Assuming that the time frame would
be less than three days, the court would have to take the lapse of time
into consideration. Even though the police would have exceeded the
temporal requirement, this alone may not have influenced the court to
change its decision.
In its current state, the exigent circumstances exception does
not violate one's Fourth Amendment rights. It is very unlikely that
the United States Supreme Court will be making drastic changes to
the warrant requirement. As long as the exigent circumstances
exception does not overpower these rights, the Court will not be in a
hurry to modify any aspect of it. However, the Court should be open
to adjusting the exception to address some flaws, such as the
temporal issue. In addition, the New York Court of Appeals should
distinguish between the application of the objective and subjective
approach to determine the existence of exigent circumstances to
eliminate any confusion between the two approaches. If this cannot
be done, then one approach needs to be eliminated for the court to
have consistent decisions when determining whether a warrantless
search is justified due to exigent circumstances and for the
147 Id. at 1032 (majority opinion).
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defendant's Fourth Amendment rights to be fully protected.
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